Abstract. Square is a multivariate quadratic encryption scheme proposed in 2009. It is a specialization of Hidden Field Equations by using only odd characteristic elds and also X 2 as its central map. In addition, it uses embedding to reduce the number of variables in the public key. However, the system was broken at Asiacrypt 2009 using a dierential attack. At PQCrypto 2010 Clough and Ding proposed two new variants named Double-Layer Square and Square+. We show how to break Double-Layer Square using a rened MinRank attack in 2 45 eld operations. A similar fate awaits Square+ as it will be broken in 2 32 eld operations using a mixed MinRank attack over both the extension and the ground eld. Both attacks recover the private key, given access to the public key. We also outline how possible variants such as Square or multi-Square can be attacked.
Introduction
In the world of Post-Quantum cryptography, Multivariate Quadratic public key schemes have an important place. They were investigated as early as 1985 [16, 14] and have branched out into several systems.
In this article, we deal with the so-called Square system, which works both over a ground eld F q with q elements, as over an extension eld F q n+ . Its main feature is the operation X 2 over F q n+ . Obviously, this is very simple to compute and invertin particular when compared to the similar system Hidden Field Equations [17] . Inversion of X 2 utilizes the equation X = ±Y q n+ +1 4
.
Hence, we need q n+ ≡ 3 (mod 4) and inverting Y ∈ F q requires only one exponentiation in F q n+ . Depending on the choice of q, n, the inversion is as ecient as for Sash [10, 1] .
Square itself was proposed 2009 in [7] . It was broken in the same year [4] using a dierential attack. At PQCrypto 2010 Clough and Ding [9] proposed two new variants of Square, called Double-Layer Square and Square+ which are claimed to be secure against all known attacks.
We will outline below how they dier from the original Square schemebut can be broken nevertheless.
One thing which has also developed with MQ schemes is their cryptanalysis. In this article, we will concentrate on attacks from the so-called MinRank family. Idea is to nd a linear combination of some matrices, such that the new matrix has a special (minimal) rank. Or more formally:
Given k matrices M 1 , . . . , M k ∈ F n×n q and a scalar r ∈ N, nd a vector λ ∈ F k q such that
We call this an MinRank(q,k,r)-problem. Note that the general MinRank problem is NPcomplete [5] . We will see later how Multivariate Quadratic schemes relate to matrices in general and to MinRank in particular.
A rst MinRank attack in the Multivariate Quadratic setting was launched against TTM [13] .
Informally speaking, the authors exploited the existence of a so-called step-structure in the private key to reveal linear relations between the private and the public key. When enough of these relations were found, the whole private key could be unravelled. A similar approach was followed in [20] . Here, the step-width was made wider: Instead of allowing only rank dierences of 1, rank dierences up to r were allowed. Finally, [22] gave further ideas on discovering rank structure, in particular crawling attacks that exploit that areas of low rank might be closeby. A cryptanalysis of the Rainbow Signature Scheme using MinRank can be found in [3] . Our attack on Double-Layer Square (see sect. 3) will strongly refer to this paper.
Another algorithm to break MinRank-instances in practice is [12] . Here, Gröbner bases are used to actually calculate elements of the kernel and thus derive possible choices of λ ∈ F k q . For some parameters this algorithm is much faster than sampling and therefore we use it in sect. 4 to break Square+.
Achievement and Organisation
In this paper, we describe an ecient cryptanalysis of the two public key schemes DoubleLayer Square and Square+. We show how to break Double-Layer Square by a rened MinRank attack that is an extension of Billet and Gilbert [3] attack against Rainbow. The overall attack complexity is 2 45 . Furthermore we break Square+ using methods from the cryptanalysis of odd characteristic HFE [2] and a MinRank attack [12] . In both cases, the attack is in polynomial time of (nearly) all parameters. In particular, the schemes are completely broken for all possible, practical choices of parameters.
In sect. 2, we introduce the Square cryptosystem and x some notation. Double-Layer Square and its attack is discussed in sect. 3. We deal with Square+ and the corresponding MinRank problem in sect. 4. This paper concludes with sect. 5. There, we also outline possible extensions to Square or multi-Square.
Notation
In this section we shortly recap the Square encryption scheme [7] . We start by giving some general outline on Multivariate Quadratic public key systems and some notation. Each MQ-scheme uses a public Multivariate Quadratic map P :
as public key. The trapdoor is given by a structured central map F :
In order to hide this trapdoor we choose two secret linear transformations S ∈ F n×n q , T ∈ F m×m q and dene P := T • F • S. Note that some proposals also use a linear and constant part of p (k) and f (k) . However, as it is well known that quadratic terms only depend on quadratic terms from the secret map F and on linear terms from S, T , we can safely ignore the linear and constant parts in our cryptanalysis to ease explanation [19, 15, 3] . Where necessary, the ane case can be added easily.
Sometimes, as for Square, the trapdoor does not reveal itself over F n q but over the extension eld
→ F q n+ be the standard isomorphism between the vector space and the extension eld and F = ϕ • F • ϕ −1 . As outlined above, Square is dened for q n+ ≡ 3 (mod 4) and uses F = X 2 over F q n+ . This can be easily inverted by the square root formula
To make their scheme more resistant, the authors of Square have chosen S as a (n + ) × n matrix of rank n. This is equivalent to deleting variables from the secret map F in the public map P. See gure 1 for an overall illustration of Square. The original parameters of the scheme are n = 34, q = 31 and = 3 [7] . Fig. 1 . The Square Scheme.
In the sequel, we will make heavy use of the matrix representation of Multivariate Quadratic polynomials. As described above, we assume all polynomials p (k) and f (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n + to be homogenized. As explained, we can do so as the linear and constant parts of the p (k) and f (k) do not carry any cryptographically relevant information. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) respectivelỹ x = (x 1 , . . . ,x n+ ) be a column vector and P (k) ∈ F n×n respectively F (k) ∈ F n+ ×n+ the matrix describing the quadratic form of p (k) = x P (k) x respectively f (k) =x F (k)x . We restrict to symmetric matrices (see gure 2). Using a minor twist, we can also represent univariate polynomials over the extension eld F q n this way. By a slight abuse of notation, we obtain the same gure 2 for the univariate polynomial
over the extension eld F q n for x = (X, X q , . . . , X n−1 ) .
3 Double-Layer Square Double-Layer Square as proposed in [9] uses the idea of Rainbow [11] to split the central map into two layers and thus destroy the dierential properties in the public map that where used to break Square. The rst layer is just the same mapping F as for Square. The second layer is dened by G :
isomorphism. It is explicitly given by
where α ∈ F q n , β is ane and γ is quadratic over F q n . The whole central map over the vector space is thus given by
With || we denote concatenation of two vectors and 
MinRank attack against Double-Layer Square
In this section we adapt the MinRank attack of Billet and Gilbert [3] to Double-Layer Square. In order to reconstruct T we have to solve the problem of nding a linear combination
for λ i ∈ F q with minimal rank. In general this is a dicult problem, as Buss et al. [5] showed that the decisional version of MinRank over F q is NP-complete.
The idea of [3] to calculate a solution of the MinRank problem is to sample a vector ω ∈ R F 2n q and hope that it lies in the kernel of a linear combination of low-rank matrices. If this is the case solving the linear system of equations
reveals a part of the secret transformation T . The crucial point is to calculate the probability over all ω that there exist values λ 1 , . . . , λ n+ ∈ F q such that
For S being an (2n + ) × (2n + ) matrix of full rank and ω ∈ R F 2n+ q this probability equals the likelihood of
While the general idea is the same for Double-Layer Square, we need to be careful as S is a (2n+ )×2n matrix of rank 2n. We will tackle this problem after having calculated the probability that there exists λ i ∈ F q fullling (5). It is well known that the probability of a random (m × n) matrix over F q being regular is given
This implies that the probability of a random (m × n) matrix over F q to be singular is bounded below by 1/(q n−m+1 ). In Fig. 5 we illustrate the coecient matrix of the linear system
for a random but xed ω ∈ F 2n+ and for g (i) = x G (i) x the associated matrix for a given secret
. . .
Coecient matrix of linear system (7).
The probability that there exist λ 1 , . . . , λ n+ ∈ F q such that (5) holds is the probability of matrix A in gure 5 to be singular, i.e. 1/q. Note that it is not enough for our attack that such a linear combination exists. In order to eciently obtain this solution using (3) we also need the rank of the whole matrix from g. 5 to be rank(A) + n. This is true with overwhelming probability in our case. Otherwise we would obtain parasitic solutions by (3).
Up to this point, the overall complexity of the MinRank attack is
as we expect to sample q vectors ω ∈ F 2n q until A becomes singular. We need to repeat this sampling until we have recovered (n + ) linearly independent equations of small rank. Solving (3) requires Gaussian elimination in (2n + ) variables. Now we have to deal with the problem that S is not a (2n + ) × (2n + ) square matrix but a rectangular (2n + ) × 2n matrix. Obviously equation (4) and (5) are not equivalent any longer,
I.e. the probability of choosing ω in the kernel of low-rank matrices is still 1/q. This argument hides a slight heuristic. If we choose ω ∈ R F 2n q , Sω is not a random element in F 2n+ q any longer and thus the rows of the matrix in g. 5 are not randomly chosen. Nevertheless they are independent and thus formula (6) should be a good approximation. Our experiments in table 1 conrm this. The backward direction is not true, as 2n+ vectors of lenght 2n are always linearly dependent and thus we obtain q parasitic solutions. The overall attack cost is therefore
Unfortunately, the authors of [9] did not provide concrete security parameters. However, using their security analysis, we derived q = 31, n = 17, = 4 for a claimed security level of 2 80 . Using our attack, this reduces to 2 45 to separate the upper from the lower level. We have broken this set of parameters in about 1 day, see Table 1 . Moreover, we can ignore the embedding modier, as explained in [2, Sect. 5] . In a nutshell, we work on the maximal rank of the corresponding matrices. However, the embedding modier will only decrease the rank and hence not increase its maximum. Hence, the dierence from g. 3 still holds. Once we have separated these layers, the rest of the attack is equal to Billet/Macario-Rat [4] , although we have to take the DoubleLayer structure into account. First, we separate out the two layers F and G. Using the algorithm of Billet/Macario-Rat, we can separate the variables of the F-layer into x 1 , . . . , x n+ (output of Billet/Macario-Rat) and x n+ +1 , . . . , x 2n+ (others). Using these, we have the variable mixing S, 
here, so Billet/Macario-Rat does not apply directly. However, we see by inspection that all monomials depending on x 1 , . . . , x n+ come from the term γ, all monomials depending both on x 1 , . . . , x n+ and x n+ +1 , . . . , x 2n+ come from βX; and the rest comes from αX 2 . Applying Billet/Macario-Rat to these gives us the complete variable change S and equation change T (up to equivalences, [21] ). Hence, we have reconstructed the private key and are therefore in the same position as the legitimate user when computing y = P(x) for given y ∈ F 2n+ q .
Experimental Results
We have implemented attack in Sage [18] . In particular, we needed to verify if the probability computations for obtaining a separation into the two layers is correct. To this aim, we have implemented full Double-Layer Square, including embedding modier and the layer structure. We have used the parameters derived from [9] and varied one of the three, i.e. the number of variables n, the embedding degree and the eld size q. The results can be found in tables 13.
In particular, we have veried that the relation #ω = qn holds, i.e. if the number of samples only depends on q times the dimension of T . Except for small values of (cf. found a good correlation. However, as for small dimensions, the ranks become small, too, so we expect that a random matrix is far more likely to exhibit such a small rank. Hence, the number of parasitic solutions increases, too. The derived parameters of Double-Layer Square were broken in just under an hour on average (3100s ≈ 50min), cf. tables 23.
All computations were carried out on a Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3350 with 2.66GHz, 4 cores, and 8GB physical RAM. For each tuple (q, n, ), we have carried out 11 independent experiments.
Each of them took up to 2 hours.
Square+
Another version of the Square cryptosystem is called Square+. It was also suggested in the very same paper as Double-Layer Square by Clough and Ding [9] . As Square, it uses X 2 over the extension eld F q n+ as its central monomial. In addition, we have p ∈ N random equations that blind the dierential structure of X 2 in the public key. In total, we obtain m := n + + p equations for Square+. Obviously, Square+ is overdeterminedboth due to the embedding of variables and the p extra polynomials. In order to prevent Gröbner based attacks, ( + p) has to be chosen relatively small compared to n. In the original Square+ paper, proposed parameters are q = 31, n = 48, = 3, p = 5 [9] . Let ϕ : F n+ q → F q n+ be the standard isomorphism between the vector space F n+ q and the nite eld F q n+ . Denote with a 1 , . . . , a p a total of p random, quadratic polynomials over F q , the so-called plus-polynomials. The mixing of the equations is realized by a full-rank matrix T ∈ F (n+ +p)×(n+ +p) q . The embedding modier is realized via a matrix S ∈ F (n+ )×n q with rank(S) = n. The Square part is expressed over the ground eld as C, the plus polynomials are given in A, see
Now we can write the public key P of Square+ as P := T • (C • S, A • S). 
Odd-Characteristic HFE Attack against Square+
To this aim, we have a closer look at odd Characteristic HFE (or odd-HFE) and its cryptanalysis [6, 2] . In particular we notice that the central map of odd-HFE is
for a set of admissible degrees ∆(D) := {(i, j) ∈ N 2 : i ≤ j, q i + q j ≤ D}, N the set of nonnegative integers and γ i,j ∈ F q n the coecients of the corresponding private key. Setting D = 2 and γ (0,0) = 1, we obtain ∆(2) = (0, 0) and the central map of odd-HFE coincides with the one of Square+. As a result, we can apply the cryptanalysis of Bettale et al. [2] against odd-HFE also against Square+. Alas, this cryptanalysis does not include the case odd-HFE+, so we need to investigate this question closely to determine if we can break Square+ within this framework.
As we will see below, it works but there are subtle changes to be made.
As for the original attack against odd-HFE, the key point is the observation that we can write X 2 as a matrix of small rank over the extension eld. More to the point, we have X 2 = x Fx over F q n+ for x = (X, X q , X q 2 , . . . , X q n−1 ) with F 1,1 = 1 but F i,j = 0 otherwise. As only F 1,1 is non-zero, we obviously have rank(F) = 1. A similar observation for a MinRank attack against HFE was already used by Kipnis-Shamir [15] . Note that expressing X 2 over the ground eld yields a much higher rank, in practice close to (n + ).
To ease notation and to mount the attack, we follow the approach of [2] and start with the vector (θ 1 , . . . , θ n+ ) ∈ F n+ q n+ . Note that this vector has a double function: First, it xes a basis of the vector space F n+ q , i.e. over the ground eld, and second, the elements θ 1 , . . . , θ n+ are simultaneously interpreted over the extension eld F q n+ . This way we can apply the homomorphism F q n+ → F q n+ : x → x q k for k = 0, . . . , (n + − 1) within the extension eld. Finally, this is used to construct a matrix M n+ .
we have the mapping φ :
Note that this mapping only uses the rst component of the vector (V 1 , . . . , V n+ ). Moreover, the rst column of M n+ consists only of base elements of F n+ q . Hence, two values V 1 ,Ṽ 1 ∈ F q n will only be equal if the corresponding vectors v,ṽ ∈ F n q are the same. The inverse mapping needs to make use of the special structure of the matrix M n+ to map elements back into the ground eld. We have φ −1 :
Using the matrix M n+ , we can now go back and forth between the two vector spaces F n+ q (ground eld) and F n+ q n+ (extension eld). The latter is a very redundant version of the former as we could use any component of the vector V = (V, V q , . . . , V q n+ −1 ) to reconstruct all other (n + − 1) elements. However, we will see below how it will help us to express the rank condition on F using only publicly available information.
There are two minor ingredients missing before we can formulate the full attack. The rst is the quadratic form of the plus polynomials a 1 , . . . , a p . As for Double-Layer Square, we write them as symmetric matrices A (i) ∈ F (n+ )×(n+ ) q with x = (x 1 , . . . , x n+ ) and a i = xA (i) x for 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Hence, we work over the ground eld here. Second, we dene matrices
Or to rephrase this, we have the all-zero matrix with the a single 1, the matrix F (1) coincides with the originally dened matrix F, and the 1 is traveling backwards on the main diagonal for each consecutive matrix F (i) . Note that evaluating M n+ F (k) M n+ yields exactly X 2 for each matrix F (k) . We now express the private key in terms of S, T, A, F and study their corresponding ranks
Replacing P on the left hand side with the public key matrices P (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n + + p), plugging in the denitions of C, A, and bringing the matrix T to the left we obtain
Again, || denotes the concatenation of vectors. Note that the overall equation is over the ground eld F q , while the matrices F (i) are over the extension eld F n+ q . There are two important remarks to be made: First, the matrices A (i) are with overwhelming probability of high rank, both over the ground eld and the extension eld F q n+ . In contrast, each column SM n+ F (1) M n+ S has at most rank 1 over the extension eld F q n+ . Note that the embedding modier does not change the latter rank property as the rank will only decrease, not increase by the embedding modier, cf. [2, Sect. 5] for a more detailed explanation of this fact. Second, we are only interested in separating out the rst (n + ) columns of the right hand side from the last p ones. So we do not look for the full matrix T −1 , but only its rst (n + ) columns. We denote them byT ∈ F (n+ +p)×(n+ ) q and have rank n + . Combining these two observations, our equation
Note that the whole equation is now over the extension eld while the coecients of the matrices P (i) come from the ground eld. For simplicity, write U :=T M n+ . By construction of M n+ we have u i,j = u q i,j−1 and u i,1 = u q i,n+ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + , 1 < j ≤ n + , so the knowledge of one column of U is enough to determine the whole matrix. Hence we only concentrate on the rst column of U and obtain
for unknown S. As our nal equation is over F n+ q we clearly have rank(H ) ≤ 1 and can thus use a similar technique as in section 3 to determine values λ i ∈ F q n+ such that rank(
by solving the corresponding MinRank(q, n + + p, 1) problem, i.e. for rank r = 1. 
Solving MinRank for Square+
All in all, there are two methods available. The rst is credited to Schnorr and works on determinants for (r + 1) × (r + 1) submatrices while the other was developed by Levy-dit-Vehel et al. [12] and uses Gröbner bases.
We start with Schorr's method. It uses the following observation: For given rank r, each submatrix of size (r + 1) × (r + 1) must have determinant zero. Hence, each such determinant gives rise to one equation of degree (r + 1). For a (τ × τ )-matrix, we can form τ r+1 2 sub-matrices (selecting r+1 rows and columns, respectively) and hence equations. Assuming that a suciently high proportion of them is linearly independent, we are able to solve the corresponding system of equations by linearization. In our case, we have r = 1 and τ := (n + + p) free variables, leading to a total of n+ +p 2 degree 2 monomials. For + p < n, this allows to compute a solution in n+ +p 2 3 ∈ O(n 6 ) computations over F q n+ and is hence polynomial in all security parameters.
For the proposed parameters n = 48, = 3, p = 5 we obtain a total workload of ≈ 2 31.77 and have hence broken the scheme.
For the second method, we inspect the kernel of the matrix H. Remember that each kernel element ω ∈ F n q n+ has the form ω := SM n+ (0,ω 2 , . . . ,ω n+ ) forω i ∈ F q n+ and 2 ≤ i ≤ (n + ). So randomly sampling vectors ω ∈ R F n q n+ needs q n+ trials on average to nd a kernel element of H and is hence exponential in the security parameters n, . It is also impractical for the proposed parameters. Thus we use the more rened technique from Levy-dit-Vehel et al. [12] to solve instances of the MinRank problem. In a nutshell, they do not sample vectors ω but calculate them. This is done by generating an overdetermined MQ-system and then solving it with Gröbner base techniques. Note that the attack complexity grows exponentially with the rank of the target matrix. However, as this rank is xed to 1 in our case, we are not concerned by this.
The dimension of the kernel of H is (n − 1) in the extension eld and thus we can x all but one coecient of ω at random and still expect a solution. The corresponding vector therefore becomes (ω 1 , . . . , ω n−1 , x) with ω i ∈ F q n+ xed values and x a free variable living over the extension eld F q n+ . Using this notation, we can formulate the following system of quadratic equations over the vector space F n q n+ :
For rank 1, we can sample a total of (n − 1) linearly independent values ω (1) , . . . , ω (n−1) from the kernel and hence obtain (n−1)n linearly independent equations in a total of (n−1)+(n+ +p) = 2n + + p − 1 unknowns. According to [12] , we expect an overall complexity of We have implemented the attack of Schnorr and found the theory in line with the practical experiments. In particular, the matrices F (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ (n + ) have rank 1 over the extension eld and we can reconstruct the matrix H for public key matrices P (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n + + p)
alone. As for our experiments with Double-Layer Square, we used Sage [18] on a Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X3350 with 2.66GHz, 4 cores, and 8GB physical RAM. Moreover, as shown in tables 47, no parameter has exponential inuence on the running time of the key recovery algorithm.
When implementing the attack a slight problem was memory consumption as Sage proved to be rather inecient here. Hence, we could not break the proposed parameters although they should be in reach for a memory optimized version of the attack.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the rst cryptanalysis of the two twin schemes Double-Layer Square and Square+. Both attacks relied heavily on the rank properties of the public key equations over the ground eld (Double-Layer) or the extension eld (Square+). In either case, each scheme is fully broken for any reasonable choice of parameters: For Double-Layer Square, the attack is exponential in the security parameter . However, as = 4 and cannot be increased too much due to generic attacks against Multivariate Quadratic schemes, it is ecient in practice. For Square+, the attack is fully polynomial in all security parameters q, , p. As we have established a strong link between odd characteristic Hidden Field Equations and Square, we know that any cryptanalytic result for the former can be exploited for the latter. So the relation between Square and odd-HFE is the same as for MIA/C * and HFE. All attacks to the latter (odd-HFE, HFE) will inevitable apply to the former (Square, MIA/C * ). Hence, any strategy to repair Square will need to take these similarities into account. In addition, we have to remember that Square will always be much weaker than odd-HFEfor reasons similar to the pair MIA/C * and HFE. Moreover, we expect that any successful cryptanalysis of odd-HFE can be turned easily in a cryptanalysis of Squaremaybe even without any further modication.
For example, transferring Square to the equivalent of multi-HFE [6] does not seem to be a good idea. It was already established that this variant actually leads to a weaker version of the original odd-HFE. Similarly, we can conclude that Square-is broken, as is MIA-. Both variations were suggested in [8] , the rst as bivariate Square", the other as Square-. On the other hand, a secure version of Square will most certainly give rise to a secure version of MIA.
In particular, Square has exactly the same big advantage over odd-HFE that MIA/C * has over HFE: Speed. When it comes to signing/decrypting, both will outperform the more secure variants by orders of magnitudes. Hence, it seems to be too early to call the overall game Square being over but it seems a fair guess that some further modications will be tried. If they will stand the test of time is a dierent question altogether.
